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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 6, 2006, Mr. Davon Jones was arraigned in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, Maryland for attempted murder. (T 1.4) .1 The State obtained two postponements.
The first on July 13, 2006, due to the prosecutor's engagement in an unrelated trial, and,
the second on January 11 , 2007, due to the prosecutor falling ill. (T2 . 4 ); (T3 . 3). Mr.
Jones ' trial counsel objected to the first postponement. (T2 . 4- 5).
The matter next convened for trial on January 19, 2007- a Friday. (T4 . 3). After
the jury was selected and sworn, the matter was recessed due to the lateness of the hour.
(T4 . 106). The following Monday, January 22, 2007, the case resumed. (T5 . 3). At that
time, the State moved for a mistrial based on the unavailability of one of its witnesses. (T 5.
4- 5). Defense counsel vigorously objected, arguing manifest necessity did not exist. (T5 .
5). Notwithstanding counsel 's protests, the trial judge declared a mistrial. (T 5 • 15).
Mr. Jones' second trial commenced on February 8, 2007, and lasted until February
12, 2007. At the close of evidence, Davon Jones was found guilty by jury verdict (case
no.: 106069033). (T 8 . 125). On March 27, 2007, a thirty-year sentence was imposed on

1

Citations to the trial transcript are as follows:
• T 1 = an-aignment, Apr. 6, 2006;
• T 2 = hearing, July 13, 2006;
• T 3 = hearing, Jan. 11 , 2007;
• T 4 = first tria l, day one, jury selection, Jan. 19, 2007;
• T 5 = first trial , day two, State's Motion for Mistrial, Jan. 22, 2007;
• T 6 =second trial, day one, jury selection, Feb. 8, 2007 ;
• T 7 = second trial , day two, Jerome Smith testifies, Feb. 9, 2007;
• T 8 = second trial , day three, Detective Williams testifies, Feb. 12, 2007;
• T 9 = sentencing, Mar. 2 7, 2007.
1

Mr. Jones. (T9 . 15). On April 27, 2016, the Honorable Michael A. DiPietro granted Mr.
Jones permission to file a belated notice of appeal. On April 28, 2016, Mr. Jones filed a
notice of appeal from his criminal convictions and sentences in this case. This appeal
follows.

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a mistrial over defense objection was manifestly necessary due to the
unavailability of Detective Williams despite the existence of reasonable alternatives,
such as a stipulation to Detective Williams' testimony or the State' s presentation of
other witnesses whose testimony would have mimicked Detective Williams'
testimony?
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recognize a prima facie case of racial
discrimination during jury selection after the prosecutor used at least four of his seven
stri kes to remove black jurors from the panel?

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 10, 2006, Mr. Jerome Smith was shot twice- once in his shoulder and
once in his arm- over a seventy dollar ($7 0.00) drug debt. (T6 • 95); (T 7. 10). He survived
the shooting and told the police, while still at the scene, he did not know who shot him.
(T 7 . 53). Mr. Smith received medical attention at Sinai Hospital. (T7 . 7). He was treated
with penicillin and was released the following morning at 9:30a.m. (T7 . 54).

The Investigation
After the shooting, Mr. Smith provided two distinct accounts of who shot him. (T 8 .
90). He provided his first account to the Baltimore Police Department's Detective Division
during two interviews in the days and weeks after the incident.
On January 11 , Detectives Williams and Diggs conducted Mr. Smith's first recorded
interview, which lasted approximately thirty minutes. (T8 . 12- 13). At_the time, Mr. Smith
had just returned home from the hospital after being shot. (T 7 . 55). Still, the detectives
showed up at Mr. Smith' s home and arrested him on a Failure to Appear warrant. T8 . lOll . They did not provide Mr. Smith with any pain medications although they were aware

that he had been shot twice the day before. (T 7 • 56); (T 8• 12). The interview concluded
when Mr. Smith was not able to identify any person who may have shot him. (T8 . 14).
Nonetheless, Detective Williams testified that he developed a list of suspects based on thi s
interview. (T 8 . 14).
A month later, the detectives spoke with Mr. Smith a second time. (T8 . 14). On
February 15, Mr. Smith was in Central Booking after having been picked up on February
14 for v iolating his probation. (T 8 . 15). Detectives Williams and Henry transported Mr.
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Smith from Central Booking to the Northwestern District Police Station (hereinafter
referred to as "stationhouse") for questioning. (T8 . 15). At the time, Mr. Smith was still
experiencing pain but, again, was offered no medication by the detectives. (T7• 61). The
detectives did, however, give him fast food ("maybe Burger King, McDonald's") and
permitted him to make personal telephone calls. (T 8 . 18-19). The February 15 interview
spanned approximately five hours and proceeded from the stationhouse to the street and
back to the stationhouse. (T7. 60).
Beginning at five o' clock m the afternoon, Detectives Williams and Henry
conducted a two-hour tape-recorded interview of Mr. Smith at the stationhouse. (T8 . 1718). During the interview, Mr. Smith was shown four photo arrays but did not make an
identification. (T8 . 17); see also (T 8 . 23). Towards the close of the interview, however,
Mr. Smith did provide the detectives with what he thought might be the location of one of

his shooters, "Baby." (T 8. 19- 20). Around 7:00p.m., Detectives Hamilton and Williams
drove Mr. Smith around in an unsuccessful attempt to locate "Baby." (T8 . 21-22). The
trio returned to the stationhouse at 9:30p.m. (T8 . 22).
Back at the stationhouse, Detective Williams showed Mr. Smith three additional
photo arrays-for a total of seven that evening. (T8 . 26). The first and second photo arrays
[State's Exhibit 9 and 10 respectively] were conducted between 10:05 and 10:20 p.m., and
were negative. (T8 . 26-28). The final photo array [State's Exhibit 11] conducted at 10:37
p.m. was positive. (T8 . 28). After identifying Davon Jones as one of his shooters, Mr.
Smith was allowed to " [call] his girlfriend one last time" and was returned to Central
Booking. (T8 . 31).

5

At trial, however, Mr. Smith fully recanted his previous statement to the police. (T 7 .
74). Mr. Smith testified he did not know Mr. Jones or his co-defendant and that he had
only cooperated with the police during his interviews to obtain the calls to his girlfriend
and mother, as well as for the food. (T7 . 74).
The Mistrial

On January 19, 2007, a Friday, Mr. Jones ' first jury was selected and sworn. (T4 .
105). On January 22, 2007, the following Monday, the State moved for a mistrial prior to
opening arguments. (T 5 . 5). The State acknowledged that the jury had been sworn, and
that jeopardy had attached.

(T5. 3). But, the State argued a mistrial was manifestly

necessary because one of its witnesses-Detective Williams-was unavailable to testify
due to a car accident. (T 5 . 3- 5).
Defense counsel "strenuously" objected to the State's mistrial motion. (T5 . 5).
Counsel noted that the case was "for all practical purposes, a single eyewitness case" and
that " [Detective Williams could not] really add anything." (T 5 . 5). In response, the State
argued it could not proceed with the trial because Detective Williams' testimony " [was]
vital to hear the circumstances, not only of the taped statement, but also the investigation,
as well." (T5 . 9). After hearing from the State, the court inquired whether the State could
proceed under a stipulation that "the entire investigation .. .was stellar." (T5 . 10). The State
answered, "Yeah." (T5 . 10).
Defense counsel agreed to stipulate that the "police officers behaved in an
appropriate and constitutional manner and followed the rules and regulations of the
department and did nothing improper such as point out the picture of the person they

6

wanted to have arrested." (T5 . 11). Defense counsel also reminded the court "there were
other persons present at ... each of these taped statements." (T 5. 12). However, when the
prosecution insisted that the parties would have to "essentially ... script [Detective
Williams ' ] testimony" for any such stipulation, the agreement fell apart. (T 5 . 12). The trial
judge thereafter determined that manifest necessity existed and granted the State's motion
for a mistrial over Mr. Jones' continued objection. (T 5. 15).
The Second Trial and Batson

Mr. Jones's second trial began on February 8, 2007. (T 6. 3). Defense counsel
submitted a Motion to Dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. (T6 . 6). This motion was
denied and the case proceeded to jury selection. (T 6 . 10). During jury selection, defense
counsel twice objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges. (T6 . 82- 90).
The record reflects that the State struck Jurors 208, 178, 270, 134, and 215, in that
order. (T 6 . 78-82). Upon Juror 215' s striking, defense counsel immediately objected. (T6 .
82- 83). Counsel noted to the court that the State had exercised peremptories on "three of
the four black men that [were] seated" in an attempt to "change the complexion literally of
the jury." (T6 . 83). The comi concluded a prima facie case of discrimination had not been
made because in the court's words,
One was an African-American gentleman who happened to sit
in seat number 1 [Juror 134] was a challenge worth making.
And number 2 was announced as acceptable by [defense
counsel] because you were the last one to address it. And at
the initial presentation caused him to make an audible sign of
displeasure. So I don' t count that one as being against the
State ... The second [, Juror 270, was] ... to, you know, a
Caucasian female and I don't count that against the
government under the circumstances. So your challenges

7

apply to three and while you're not raising an issue as to them
individually, you 're raising the question of the process as a
pattern.
(T6 . 83-84 ). The court did not address the removal of Jurors 208, 178, and 215, and the
State did not proffer explanations for its use of any of its peremptory challenges. (T6 . 8284).
During alternate juror selection, the State exercised tvvo additional peremptory
challenges on Jurors 34 1 and 343 . (T6 . 87-88). Defense counsel renewed her allegation
of purposeful discrimination. (T6 . 88- 90). Counsel argued,
(Indiscernible) need to challenge the State's use of its
peremptory challenges on the basis of (indiscernible)
established the practice (indiscernible) black men were
challenged but one. And I believe probably (indiscernible) to
suggest one remains (indiscernible). There's no good reason
that there should not be a single (indiscernible) a single black
man on that jury.
(T6 . 88- 89). Counsel also challenged as unsound the court's prior justification for the
prosecutor' s removal of Juror 134- "if we eliminated people from jury service every time
they made a face or a funny sound, we'd never get anybody in the box." (T 6 . 89). The
court disagreed and summarily dismissed counsel's renewed claim with a single word,
"Denied." (T6 . 90) .

Sentencing
Mr. Jones was nineteen-years old when he was sentenced to twenty years for
attempted murder followed by a consecutive ten-year sentence for the use of a handgun in
the commission of a crime ofviolence. (T9 . 3); (T9 . 13-14).

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WAS NO MANIFEST NECESSITY FOR A MISTRIAL, DECLARED
OVER DEFENSE OBJECTION, WHERE THERE WERE REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVES TO DETECTIVE WILLIAMS' TESTIMONY INCLUDING
AN AGREED-TO STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES AND THE
AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATE WITNESSES.
On Monday, January 22, 2007, Davon Jones ' trial judge declared a mistrial was
manifestly necessary upon learning that one of the State's future witnesses, Detective
Wayne Williams of the Baltimore City Police Department, had been in an automobile
accident and was unavailable to testify that day. (T5 . 3-4). A trial court's declaration of a
mi strial in a criminal case is a momentous decis.ion that implicates the accused's Fifth
Amendment rights to (I) have hi s trial completed by a particular tribunal and (2) not be put
twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The importance of these two constitutional rights
require appellate courts to ensure that a trial court exercised "sound discretion" when
declaring a mistrial. As analyzed in detail below, the trial judge in the instant case failed
to exercise sound discretion because he (1) wrongly concluded that manifest necessity
existed and (2) declared a mistrial without addressing the available alternatives. Because
Davon Jones' Fifth Amendment rights were violated, reversal is required.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, " [No person]
shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.

The double jeopardy prohibition is incorporated against the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment because the afforded protecti on represents a
"fundamenta l ideal in our constitutional heritage." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794

9

(1969). Indeed, our American scheme of justice recognizes "that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal ... as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty." Benton, 395 U.S. at 796 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957)).
Nonetheless, mistrials do occur in our justice system in a variety of circumstances
that may permit subsequent retrial. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 ( 1824);

Downum v. Un ited States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963); Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S. 497,
505 (1978). The circumstances that warrant retrial are limited to those that further the
administration of justice. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688- 89 (1949); Gori v. United

States, 367 U.S . 364, 368 (1961). When the defense objects to a mistrial, the interests of
justice instruct that a retrial is permitted only when the trial court finds it is manifestly
necessary to subordinate the accused's "valued right to have the trial concluded by a
particular tribunal ... to the public interest in affording the prosecutor" a full opportunity to
try the accused. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505. The prosecution bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating manifest necessity. l d.
Maryland courts have joined the Supreme Court in explaining that the process of
finding man ifest necessity is a matter of degree for which no rigid formula exists. Hubbard

v. State, 395 Md. 73, 90 (2006) (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971)).
Indeed, manifest necessity is dependent "upon the unique facts and circumstances of each
case." Hubbard, 395 Md. at 90.
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Given that a trial judge's inquiry into manifest necessity turns on perceived degrees,
appellate courts have fashioned different standards for reviewing a trial judge's decision to
abort a criminal trial mid-stream. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-10. "The strictest
scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical
prosecution evidence ... [But a] trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial when he considers
the jury deadlocked is ... accorded great deference by a reviewing court." !d. at 508-10.
This Court has interpreted strictest scrutiny to mean that the trial judge must have
exercised " limited discretion" in finding manifest necessity.

McCorkle v. State, 95

Md.App. 31, 61 (1993). The exercise of limited discretion does not permit re-prosecution
"so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict." Cornish v. State,
272 Md. 312, 320 (1974) (quoting Downum, 372 U.S. at 736). The Court of Appeals has
found this to be true because ordinarily the lack of prosecutorial evidence, regardless of
fault, does not constitute manifest necessity. In reMark R., 294 Md. 244, 262 (1982) ("A
deficiency in the prosecution's evidence ordinarily... does not constitute ' manifest
necessity' justifying an unconsented mi strial."). Rather, a mistrial based on a witness's
unexpected absence is most appropri ate when the parties use their opening arguments to
relay to the jury the importance of the later absent w itness. McCorkle, 95 Md. App. at 61
(exp laining both parti es' extensive discussion of a later absent w itness in opening created
the potential for prejudice justifying a mistrial); see also United States v. Gallagher, 743
F.Supp. 745 , 749 (D.Or. 1990) (explaining manifest necessity existed when counsel for
both parties indicated in opening arguments that an anticipated witness, who later refused
to testify, was a critical w itness to the case).
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The Court of Appea ls has confirmed that a trial judge operates within tightly
proscribed boundaries when granting a mistrial due to the absence of prosecution evidence.
In Hubbard, the Court of Appeals held in such cases, "the trial judge must engage in the
process of exploring reasonable alternatives and determine that there is no reasonable
alternative to the mistrial" prior to declaring manifest necessity.

395 Md. at 92.

Additionally, the fact that a trial court explores whether reasonable alternatives exist does
not shelter the trial judge' s mistrial declaration from review. !d. at 93 (" We acknowledge
that the trial court did explore other various alternatives to a mistrial. Nevertheless, his
exploration was only part of the equation, because there was a reasonable alternative to the
decision to declare a mistrial.").
Finally, in a line of unbroken cases, it has been determined that any doubt as to
whether manifest necessity exists must be "resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen."

McCorkle , 95 Md. App. at 47 (citing Downum, 372 U.S. at 737- 38); Hubbard, 395 Md. at
93.

For example, in In re Mark R. a mistrial was declared because "[the State's

complainant] did not have a satisfactory comprehension and ability to communicate in the
English Language" and could therefore not be understood by the Master during crossexamination. 294 Md. at 246. The Court of Appeals reversed and reasoned that even if
the Master was justified in determining that the Compl ainant was unable to communicate,
"the problem was a failure of the prosecution to have another witness present, namely an
interpreter." I d. at 264. At bottom, the Master' s decision to grant the severe remedy of a
mistrial was improper when other favorable alternatives, such as " a short continuance for
the purpose of obtaining an interpreter," were avai lable. !d. at 264-65.
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More recently, the Court of Appeals in State v. Hart found that a trial court's mistrial
declaration on a specific count after receiving a partial verdict from a deadlocked jury
unfairly prejudiced the defendant who was involuntarily absent due to a medical
emergency. 449 Md. 246, 254 (2016). The Hart Court equated a defendant's right to
receive a verdict with a defendant's right to be present at the declaration of a mistrial
because "the mere face-to-face contact may cause some of the jurors to change their
position." !d. at 280. Consequently, the interests of justice would have been better served
if the trial court had announced a continuance during which it could have determined the
extent of Mr. Hart' s absence. !d. at 282.
At trial in the instant case, based on testimony at an earlier hearing, the State
anticipated that Mr. Smith would recant his claim that Davon Jones was one of the people
who shot him, and would otherwise cast doubt on the propriety of the police department's
investigation. (T5. 6). Therefore, the State's chief argument in support of a mistrial was
that, "Detective Williams [was] a critical witness because the critical issue in this case
[was] the reliability of[Mr. Smith's] taped statements." (T5 . 4). However, the court, under
the strictest scrutiny test, had limited authority to grant a mistrial on that basis aloneindeed, unlike in McCorkle and Gallagher, Detective Williams' unexpected absence did
not prejudice the State because at the time the State moved for a mistrial, it had not yet
made any presentation to the jury. (T5 . 3-5). Thus, the State's sole basis for the mistrial
is reducible to an attempt to preserve a more favorable opportunity to convict.
Consequently, the court was obligated to pursue reasonable alternatives to declaring a
mistrial.
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The record shows the trial court singularly focused on whether the parties could
stipulate to Detective Wi lliams' testimony as a way of avoiding a mistrial. (T5. 9- 10). The
State agreed that the trial could continue if the defense agreed to stipulate that Mr. Smith' s
earlier statements were reliable. (T 5. 10- 11) (reflecting the State replied "Yeah" when
asked by the trial judge if it could proceed to trial if "the defense agreed that the entire
investigati on ... was stellar"). Defense counsel immediately indicated that Mr. Jones was
wi lling to stipulate with respect to Mr. Smith's earli er cooperation that " [Detective
Williams and other involved police officers] behaved in an appropriate and constitutional
manner and followed the rules and regulations of the department and did nothing
improper." (T5 . 11 ). Given that the parties were in agreement that a stipulation resolving
the State's basis for a mistrial was possible, a reasonab le alternative existed. (T5 . 11).
Ultimately, however, a stipulation was not reached because the prosecution insisted that
the stipulation contain concessions encompassing not just the Smith interrogations, but also
the entire police investi gation. (T5 . 12-14).
Assuming arguendo that the trial court concluded correctly that stipulation was
unlikely, multiple alternatives existed to the tri al court's declaration of a mistrial that may
have addressed the prosecution's concerns. There were numerous witnesses who might
have provided testimony about the questioning of Mr. Smith and the broader police
investigation.
For example, the record reflects that Detective Williams was not the only detective
present when Mr. Smith recorded his statements. (T5 . 12). Counsel for Mr. Jones' codefendant timely reminded the court of two detectives ' presence at Mr. Smith's recorded
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interviews. (T5 . 12) (showing Detective Diggs was present for the January 11th taped
statement and that Detective Henry was present for the following two taped statements).
The court responded, "How extraordinary. But ... one of the things it does not address is
[Detective Williams'] testimony on the nature of the investigation that went beyond just
speaking to the victim." (T 5. 12). At trial, however, Detective Williams testified that he
worked in the field with Detective Ham ilton when carrying out hi s investigation. (T8 . 22).
Consequently, the record reflects that the trial judge's concerns discussed above were
unfounded.
As such, the trial judge had a number of alternatives to a mistrial before him. He
could have found (1) that a stipulation was reached between the parties regarding Detective
Williams' testimony, (2) that Detective Diggs could have testified regarding Mr. Smith' s
January 11 statement, (3) that Detective Henry could have testified regarding Mr. Smith's
February 15 statements, (4) that Detective Hamilton could have testified regarding the
nature of the investigation on February 15, or (5) the trial judge could have found that a
stipulation was reached and that Detectives Diggs, Henry, and Hamilton could have all
testified in part to areas the stipulation did not reach. Because the record demonstrates that
a mistrial was not manifestly necessary, the prosecution was barred from re-trying Mr.
Jones by the Fifth Amendment' s double j eopardy prohibition.

15

II.

THE TRIAL JUDGE CLEARLY ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AFTER THE STATE
EXERCISED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THREE OF THE FOUR
AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES ALREADY SEATED AS WELL AS ON TWO
ALTERNATE JURORS.
On February 8, 2007, Mr. Jones' second trial began. Duringj ury selection, the State
exercised a total of seven peremptory challenges-five on potential primary jurors and two
on prospective alternate jurors. Defense counsel objected twice and argued that the State
had used its peremptories with a racially discriminatory purpose. Peremptory challenges
are central to our criminal justice system but their use must not violate a potential juror's
constitutional rights to equal protection under the law and the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair triaL Here, because the trial court refused to acknowledge that a prima facie
case of discrimination had been established, reversal is required.
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State
from purposefully excluding prospective jurors from the jury box on the basis of race.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
Indeed, racial discrimination during jury selection serves as "a primary example of the evil
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85
(1986); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
In order to give full effect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
concluded that a pa1iy' s privilege to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror " is subject
to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; Gilchrist v.

State, 340 Md. 606, 624- 25 ( 1995) ("A peremptory challenge based on race cannot be
squared with equal protection principles."). To that end, the Batson Court announced a
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three-step framework for evaluating whether a peremptory challenge has been exercised in
a discriminatory manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96- 98.
A trial court's adherence to this three-step framework helps to preserve the integrity
of our criminal justice system.

Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 329 (2002) ("The

underlying purpose of Batson and its progeny is to protect the defendant' s right to a fa ir
trial, to protect the ven ireperson's ri ght not to be excluded on an impermissible
discriminatory basis, and to preserve public confidence in the judicial system."). As the
Supreme Court has noted "[t]he Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers
to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection
process." Johnso n v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005).
The Batson framework proceeds in three distinct phases. First, the opponent of a
peremptory strike must demonstrate a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in
selection of the venire. Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 59 (1 988) . "No particular form of
words is necessary" w hen invoking a Batson challenge. Hershey v. Maryland, No. 1912,
2015 WL 611 0454, at *6 (Md.App. July 9, 2015). Second, once a prima facie case has
been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to offer a race neutral
explanation for its peremptory challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. "A new trial will be
required if the State cann ot produce satisfactory nondiscrimin atory reasons for every
peremptory challenge exercised to exclude a black juror." Stanley, 313 Md. at 92. Third,
the tri al judge must determine whether the defense has established purposeful
discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that establishing a prima facie showing at
Step One of Batson is not an especially high threshold or onerous task. Ray-Simmons v.
State, 446 Md. 429,436 (2016). A prima facie case exists when the "totality of the relevant

facts" allows the inference that a member of a cognizable racial group has been
discriminated against. Batson, 4 76 U.S . at 93-94. Thus, the facts must show the stricken
juror is a member of a cognizable racial group. Mejia v. State , 328 Md. 522, 534 (1992).
Membership alone may establish a prima facie case "depending on ' how, if at all, the
[proponent responds] to the proffer or asserti on ' that the [juror] struck [is a member] of
that [cognizable racial] group." Elliott v. State, 185 Md.App. 692, 714 (2009) (quoting
M ejia, 328 Md. at 534). To that point, "if there is no disagreement as to the issue of group

membership" then "the fact will be deemed established." Mejia, 328 Md. at 535- 36.
Purposeful racial discrimination may be established as a prima facie matter when a
party exerci ses its peremptory challenges on just one juror belonging to a cognizable racial
group. For exampl e, in Mejia the State' s striking of a juror who happened to be the only
Hispanic in the jury panel was sufficient to show a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
Mejia, 328 Md. at 539 (" Where the record reveals that but one person with an Hispanic

background was in the venire and the State struck that person, it may be concluded that a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination has been proven."). Importantly, Mejia
recogni zes that a peremptory challenge may invidiously effect more than just the subj ect
of the challenge- i.e., the strike may have rippling effects on the venire's racial
composition. I d. ("By that one strike, one hundred percent of the Hispanics in the venire
were stricken.").
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A party' s use of peremptory challenges on multiple prospective jurors belonging to
a cognizable racial group may also establish the inference as a prima facie matter. Indeed,
the Batson Court instructed th.at peremptory challenges having a disproportionate impact
on a cognizable racial group may circumstantially show "discriminatory impact... ' because
in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial
grounds. "' Batson, 4 76 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
( 1976)). In Batson, the Supreme Court found "a pattern of strikes against black jurors
included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination." 4 76
U.S. at 97. Maryland agrees. Ray-Simmons, 446 Md. at 436.
In Ray-Silnmons, the Court of Appeals noted a prima facie case had been established
once the defendant explained that the State had exercised each of its five total peremptory
challenges to remove African American men from the jury, i.e. , one hundred percent of its
peremptories were used to exclude black jurors. Id. at 443. But, Maryland has also found
that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be established when less than one
hundred percent of a party' s peremptories are used on black jurors. Stanley, 313 Md. at
72- 74 ( 1988) (exp laining an inference of racial discrimination was established when " [the
State] used 80 percent of its strikes to remove blacks who constituted less than 25 percent
of the venire").
In the instant case, defense counsel's first objection to the State's peremptory
challenges focused on Jurors 134,2 15, and either 178 or 208 as constituting a " pattern and
practice of eliminating the non-white perspective juror." (T6 . 82- 90). Counsel specifically
noted that the State had removed "three of the four black men that [were] seated." (T6 . 83).
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At the tri al j udge's prompting, the State c larified it had to that point used fi ve strikes in
tota l. (T6 . 83). Consequently, at this stage of jury selection, defense counsel had already
demonstrated that the State had used three of its five (s ixty percent) peremptory challenges
on African American men. (T6 . 83). Moreover, defense counsel showed that the State had
removed seventy-fiv e percent of the African American men from the jury pane l. Therefore,
the case at bar is similar to Ray-Simmons and Stanley. Yet, the trial judge stated defense
counsel had not establi shed a prima facie showing based on a pattern of purposeful
discrimination. (T6 . 84).
Even assuming the State's use of s ixty percent of its challenges on black veniremen
was insuffici ent, its continued removal of jurors of color over defense counse l's objection
should have changed the calcu lus. (T 6• 88- 90) (reflecting defense counsel's argument that
the State' s challenges to two alternates further established its practice of eliminating the
non-wh ite prospective j uror). Defense counsel argued, "There's no good reason that there
should not be a single (indiscernible) a s ingle black man on [the] jury." (T6 . 89). Again,
however, the lower court erred by not proceeding to Batson 's second step. (T6 . 90); see

Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 87 (1988) ("We believe that when the State uses peremptories
in a manner that assures no blacks will serve on a jury that is to try a black defendant, it is
at least permissible to conclude that a prima facie case of discrimination has been made
out.").
M ary land first considered the appropriate remedy for a Batson v iolation in

Stanley v. State. 313 Md. 50 (1988). In the years since Stanley, Maryland courts have
determined that while a limited remand is generally the appropriate remedy, a new trial
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should be granted when a limited remand would not allow for the ci rcumstances
surrounding the Batson violation to be fairly reconstructed. See Mej ia, 328 Md. at 540;

Edmonds, 372 Md. at 341. With respect to Mr. Jones' case, nearly ten years have passed
since his second trial. T 6 . 3. Consequently, it would be a nearly impossible task for the
State to exp lain its peremptories and a new trial is warranted. Ray-Simmons, 446 Md. at
44 7 (observing that a period of four years since the established Batson violation was too
great to overcome).
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CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Jones respectfully requests that his conviction be
vacated, and his case dismissed, or at a minimum, that his case be remanded for a new
trial consistent with Batson v. Kentucky.
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

The Constitution o(tlte United States o(America
U.S. CONST. amend. V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases ari sing in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
§ I:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein th ey reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
§2:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the w hole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state.
§3 :
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the U nited States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
di sability.
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§4:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, sha11 not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
§5:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

24

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 8-112

1. This brief contains 5,3 51 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted from
the word count by Rule 8-112.
2. This brief complies w ith the font, spacing, and type s ize re quirements stated
in Ru le 8-112.

25

DAVON JONES ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,

*

IN THE

*
*
*

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

*
*

OF MARYLAND

*

September Term, 2016

*

No. 547

*

Appellee.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this {_&_ day ofNovember, 2016, three copies of the
Brief of Appellant were mailed, first class, postage pre-paid, to the Office of the Attorney
General, Criminal Appeals Division, 17th Floor, 200 St. Paul Place, Baltimore, Maryland
21202 .

~~~
attJ1eW T. Healy*~ j
Counsel for Appellant

*Practicing pursuant to Rule 19-21 7, Rules Governing Admission to the Maryland Bar.

